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On September 25th 1959, Li Chin, head of the Republic of China’s (ROC) lega-
tion in Bogotá, informed the Colombian government in a diplomatic note, about an 
invitation that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) had extended to  
 
certain leftist elements in Colombia to send a cultural delegation to the Chi-
nese continent, to celebrate the 10th anniversary of the establishment of the 
communist regime, and to […] organize an exhibition of [Chinese] contempo-
rary arts and crafts in some Colombian cities with the purpose of spreading 
Marxist ideology.1 
 
The diplomat warned, too, that the flow of Colombians going to communist 
countries, and in particular to the PRC, had increased in the previous few years. Those 
travelers had not only created false images among Colombians about the social ad-
vantages of communism, but had also allowed the communists to spread an ideology 
that was contrary to Colombian ‘democratic and religious traditions’.2 
The note was accompanied by two letters3 written some months earlier in Bei-
jing, in which Chu Po-Shen, vice-president of the Chinese People’s Association for 
Friendship with Foreign Countries (CPAFFC), asked the Secretary and the President 
of a Colombian-Chinese Friendship Association (CCFA) for support to strengthen the 
cultural links between the PRC and Colombia.4 These letters, obtained somewhere in 
                                                 
1 Archivo General de la Nación, Bogotá, Colombia (AGN), Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, 
Diplomática y Consular (MINREX), Legación de China en Colombia, 1954-1959, F=167, C=3, 
CJ=214, Li Chin to the Minister of Justice Germán Zea Hernandez, ff. 144-145. 
2 Idem. 
3 AGN, MINREX, Legación de China en Colombia, 1954-1959, F=167, C=3, CJ=214, Chu Po-
Shen to Alfonso Romero Buj, Beijing, 1/08/1959, ff. 132-133; Chu Po-Shen to Senator Horacio 
Rodriguez Plata, Beijing, 3/08/1959, ff. 134-135. 
4 Idem. The CPAFFC was founded in May 1954 to promote civic exchanges with countries that 
did not have diplomatic relations with the PRC. See Sullivan, Lawrence R. Historical Dictionary 
of Chinese Foreign Affairs. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2018, p. 85; Brady, Anne-Marie. 
Making the Foreign Serve China: Managing Foreigners in the People’s Republic. Lanham, MD: 




the Pacific by the ROC intelligence services,5 highlight both the Taiwanese govern-
ment’s efforts to stem the development of relations between the PRC and Latin Amer-
ican countries, and the PRC’s interest in establishing closer links with supporters of 
the Chinese Communist Revolution around the world.  
The ROC’s legation in Bogotá had been careful to build a relationship of trust 
and mutual benefit with the Colombian government since 1951, when the Chinese 
nationalists had been forced to leave Mainland China to settle in Taiwan.6 For the 
ROC, Colombia was an interesting ally on a distant continent: the South American 
country had coasts along both the Pacific and the Atlantic Oceans, which allowed 
ROC diplomats assigned there to easily access the Andean and Caribbean countries 
alike.7 Additionally, Colombia had been the only Latin American country to partici-
pate in the US-led coalition in the Korean War (1950-1953), which underscored its 
status as a reliable ally in the fight against international communism.8 Abundant his-
torical evidence shows that the ROC diplomats had built powerful lobbying influence 
around some of the most powerful political and economic circles in Colombia, in or-
der to maintain a naval and diplomatic blockade against the PRC. ROC diplomats had 
acted to prevent any kind of cultural or political cooperation between the Chinese 
Communists and their potential supporters in Latin America and the Caribbean (fig. 
1).9 
This concern about the cultural ties that the Chinese Communists were establish-
ing with Colombia and other countries in the Pacific basin—such as Ecuador, Peru 
and Bolivia—remained at the fore of Taiwanese preoccupations for at least three dec-
ades. This policy came in response to the persistent and vigorous attempts by the PRC 
to break the diplomatic blockade created by Taiwan and the US and supported by 
various other states. A country under constant threat, lacking international recognition 
and increasingly dependent on the USSR, the PRC sought to export and exchange 
                                                 
5 The letters were probably intercepted somewhere in the Pacific Ocean by the National Security 
Bureau, the organization created in 1955 by a Presidential Directive from Chiang Kai-shek, to 
supervise and coordinate the military security of Taiwan.  
6 Those efforts were answered by the Colombian government, which in 1954 sent a Colombian 
consul from Yokohama on an official visit to Taipei. The documents from that official visit are in 
AGN, MINREX, Legación de China en Colombia, 1954-1959, F=167, C=3, CJ=214.  
7 Members of the ROC legation in Bogotá moved permanently to Panama, Ecuador, Cuba, Vene-
zuela and the Dominican Republic. 
8 Rojas, Daniel. “Una geografía global del Combate. Asia y América Latina en los orígenes de la 
Guerra fría.” Contemporánea. Historia y problemas del siglo XX, Año 8, Volumen 8, 2017, pp. 55-
71. 
9 AGN, MINREX. Another element that must be taken into consideration, but that I will not be 
able to develop here, is the link that existed between the Catholic archbishoprics of Taipei and 
Bogotá, an old link that could also be exploited by ROC diplomats to approach Colombian politi-
cians and jointly oppose international communism. The documents of the visit of the Archbishop 
of China to President Laureano Gómez are quite revealing. AGN, MINREX, Legación de China 




ideas and ideologies, information, art and other aspects of culture and society in an 
effort to build broad support for the new Communist regime. 
In this article, I will present some historical evidence of the PRC’s cultural di-
plomacy towards Colombia between 1952 and 1977. This period covers the years be-
tween the Peace Congress of Asia and the Pacific Rim of 1952 (the first international 
event organized by the PRC after 1949) and the beginning of the Reforms and Open-
ing-Up policy initiated by Deng Xiaoping in 1976, a period of transition in the PRC’s 
history that is seen as a foreshadowing of the 1978 economic reforms. In the first part 
of the article, I will focus on the spread of Maoism in Colombia and in the creation of 
the CCFA. In the second part, I will examine the construction of a network of foreign 
experts working in the PRC and Latin America. Next, I will contextualize the creation 
of the Xinhua Chinese Radio (XNCR) satellite in Bogotá and discuss the radio pro-
gram Pekin Informa, broadcasted from Beijing to eleven Latin American countries. 
Finally, I will emphasize the role of the Pekin Informa magazine in building a trans-
pacific information network and examine the local-level impact of this network by 
highlighting the case of the Bogotá bookstore Cinco Continentes (Five Continents). 
The evidence I present on the following pages has two purposes: first, to provide 
certain elements for studying a little-known chapter of the connections between two 
peripheral countries during the Cold War, and second, to judge the effectiveness of 




A Soft Power Strategy from across the Pacific 
 
In the early 1960s, the PRC’s efforts to approach the Latin American countries 
became more apparent. After the Sino-Soviet Split (1962) and the outbreak of the 
Sino-Indian War (Oct. 1962-Nov. 1962), the PRC found itself isolated from other 
Asian countries and without the backing of its most powerful ally, the USSR. The 
break with the Soviets forced the PRC to implement a radical shift in its foreign policy 
and to seek new ways of formal and informal participation in the post-WWII world 
order. One of these new ways was a soft power strategy based both on the appeal of 
Maoist ideology to the rest of the world and on the creation of friendship associations 












The Spread of Maoism 
 
The Sino-Soviet Split coincided with a series of peasant revolts in the Philip-
pines, Colombia and Peru, and with protests by miners in Bolivia.10 While these pro-
tests did not have a single cause, they did have a common claim base: access to land, 
better wages, the right to unionize and education for children. In the case of Colombia, 
for different groups of intellectuals, students and unionists belonging to the urban up-
per and middle classes, Soviet Communism was unable to transform countries such 
as Colombia because of its radical conception of industrial and urban workers as being 
the avant-garde of the revolution. Conversely, Maoism and the Chinese Communist 
Revolution provided a more tangible alternative to the Russian Revolution, by offer-
ing an interpretation of Marxism-Leninism for countries in which the proportion of 
peasants was greater than that of industrial workers. The PRC represented an alterna-
tive modernization model to those of the USSR and western industrial democracies. 
Maoism was not totally new in Latin America in the early 1960s. In Colombia, 
the first Maoist texts had been translated, printed and disseminated within the Colom-
bian Communist Party (CoCP).11 The advances of the Chinese Civil War (1927-1949) 
and the establishment of Mao Zedong as the undisputed leader of the Chinese com-
munists were known through newspapers such as El Tiempo (Col.) and El Espectador 
(Col.), which published news and chronicles based on information from international 
news agencies such as Havas, Reuters, BBC and Agence France-Press. However, the 
rapid spread of Maoism in Latin America took place some decades later, at the world 
juncture that was created between the triumph of the Cuban Revolution (1959) and 
the Sino-Soviet Split. 
On the one hand, the Cuban Revolution demonstrated that there was an alterna-
tive way to build communism in the Caribbean, other than the Soviet and Chinese 
approaches. In various circles of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the fact that 
there was a new Latin American alternative for building socialism meant that sooner 
or later the Chinese experience would lose its appeal. For this reason, despite the sup-
posed camaraderie that existed between the Chinese Communists and the Cubans, the 
triumph of the Cuban Revolution prompted the PRC to co-opt Latin Americans and 
                                                 
10 Interview of William Calvo by Arturo Alape, in Alape, Arturo. La paz, la violencia: testigos de 
excepción. Bogotá: Editorial planeta, 1985, p. 303; Rothwell, Matthew Daniel. “Influencia de la 
revolución china en América Latina: México, Perú y Bolivia”. Fuentes. Revista de la Biblioteca y 
Archivo Histórico de la Asamblea Legislativa Plurinacional, 2010, pp. 5-11; Kerkvliet, Benedict 
John. The Huk Rebellion. A Study of Peasant Revolt in the Philippines. Lanham, MD: Rowman & 
Littlefield, [1977] 2002. 
11 Ortiz, Rodolfo Antonio. Los orígenes del maoísmo en Colombia: la recepción de la Revolución 
de Nueva Democracia, 1949-1963. Doctoral thesis, Universidad nacional de Colombia, Facultad 




to start a campaign to demonstrate that the Chinese Revolution, not the Cuban alter-
native, was the true path that the countries of Latin America and Africa should follow. 
On the other hand, the Sino-Soviet Split created a global divide within com-
munist parties that allowed for the emergence of Maoism. In Latin American Com-
munist Parties, in particular in Colombia and Peru, the divide in the global communist 
movement resulted in a series of internal breaks that produced new “Marxist-Leninist” 
groups, or in other words, groups of communists who following Mao Zedong’s 1964 
declaration against Nikita Khrushchev, in which he argued that Soviet Communism 
was a betrayal of the fundamental principles of Marx and Lenin.12 For the new “Marx-
ists-Leninists”, the PRC path toward communism not only represented the possibility 
of massively integrating the peasantry, but also meant abandoning the postulate of 
peaceful coexistence between Communism and Capitalism that Khrushchev had an-
nounced at the 20th Congress of the USSR in 1956. As interpreted in Colombia, Mao-
ism represented the possibility of seizing power through armed struggle.13 
 
 
The Friendship Associations 
 
A second pillar in the PRC’s cultural diplomacy was the creation of a network of 
friendship associations around the world led by the CPAFFC. In 1959, the year in 
which certain members of the CCP established contact with Colombian representa-
tives for the first time, Chu Po-Shen, author of one of the aforementioned letters, was 
the general secretary of the CPAFFC, while the famous calligrapher Chu Tunan was 
its president.14 Founded in May 1954 to promote civic and cultural exchanges with 
countries that did not have diplomatic relations with the PRC, the CPAFFC was the 
central core of the relations between the PRC and Colombia until 1980. In that year, 
the Colombian government—on the advice of many influential Colombian business-
men, journalists, artists and politicians belonging to the CCFA—sent its first ambas-
sador to Beijing.15 
                                                 
12 Westad, Odd Arne. The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our 
Times. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006. 
13 The armed way to take power required waging a protracted people’s war, which consisted of 
maintaining the support of the population and attracting the enemy to the rural areas, where it 
could be defeated through a mixture of mobile warfare and guerrilla warfare. The protracted peo-
ple’s war sought to take power in a country by laying siege to its cities from the countryside.  
14 AGN, MINREX, Legación de China en Colombia, 1954-1959, F=167, C=3, CJ=214, Chu Po-
Shen to Senator Horacio Rodriguez Plata, Beijing, 3 August 1959, ff. 134-135. 
15 Gómez de Moreno, Graciela. “Los primeros pazos y la consolidación de las relaciones.” China 
y Colombia. 35 años de travesía diplomática. Bogotá: La Imprenta Editores S. A., Embajada de 
la República Popular China en Colombia/Cancillería de la República de Colombia/Asociación de 




The creation of the CCFA remains unclear. In a 2006 article, some influential 
current CCFA members suggest that the association was created in September 1977 
by a group of Colombians with different political tendencies, but united around the 
common purpose of strengthening the bonds of friendship with the PRC.16 However, 
the letters that Chu Po-Shen addressed to the lawyer and intellectual Alfonso Romero 
Buj and to Senator Horacio Rodriguez Plata17 in August 1959, as well as certain oral 
interviews, provide evidence that an early version of the CCFA may have been  cre-
ated unofficially during a visit by a Colombian parliamentary delegation to Beijing in 
the final weeks of June 1959.18   
Most of the Colombian political elites were Catholics, anti-communist and 
aligned with US foreign policy in the Pacific. They viewed the Chinese Communist 
Revolution as one more threat caused by the Communist Bloc. The active propaganda 
campaign of the ROC’s diplomats in Bogotá and Cartagena against the new authori-
ties of the PRC further strengthened the poor image that Communist China had among 
the Colombian elites. However, it is quite likely that before 1977, a nucleus of people 
in the Colombian Liberal Party, who had contacts with the PRC, had advocated for 
establishing ties with Beijing without necessarily promoting the establishment of 
communism in Colombia. 
 
 
Experts, Radio and Reviews in PRC-Colombian Relations 
 
The PRC’s soft power strategy was based on a cultural diplomacy that used tan-
gible methods of action to establish ties of friendship and influence with Latin Amer-
ican countries, in particular those in the Pacific Rim. This cultural diplomacy united 
a network of domestic and international institutions such as the PRC’s universities 
and news agencies, and had different means of communication such as reviews and 
radio broadcasting. 
 
Foreign Experts or Foreign Specialists 
“We have met in Beijing to talk about peace”, Colombian writer and intellectual 
Jorge Zalamea wrote in 1952 with an optimistic tone.19 Along with 400 other dele-
gates from around the world, Zalamea participated in the Asia and Pacific Rim Peace 
Conference of that year, the first international meeting organized by the PRC, which 
                                                 
16 Idem. 
17 Helguera, J. León. “Horacio Rodríguez Plata (1915–1987)”. Hispanic American Historical Re-
view, 71 (1), 1991, pp. 145-147, https://doi.org/10.1215/00182168-71.1.145. 
18 Franco Burgos, Joaquín. “Viaje parlamentario a China.” China y Colombia, op. cit., p. 78. 




coincided with the commemorations of the fourth anniversary of the Chinese Com-
munist Revolution.20 Along with Zalamea were other Colombians such as painter 
Alipio Jaramillo, renowned writer and anthropologist Manuel Zapata Olivella, and 
politician and intellectual Diego Montaña Cuellar. The event, which was to serve as a 
peace conference to counterbalance the international power of the western belligerents 
of the Korean War, also counted the participation of Mexican painter Diego Rivera 
and poets Nicolás Guillén, of Cuba, and Pablo Neruda, of Chile.21  
The conference allowed a whole generation of Latin Americans and representa-
tives of the entire world to unite around a pacifist movement, whose goal was to avoid 
the outbreak of a Third World War. Incidentally, the conference made members of the 
CCP aware of a practical problem: the fact that, at the end of the Chinese Civil War, 
all Spanish speakers of Mainland China had followed Chiang Kai-shek to the ROC, 
and thus virtually none of the conference organizers spoke Spanish. This made inter-
actions with the Latin American delegates difficult. On the eve of the event, the con-
ference organizers desperately started looking for someone who spoke Spanish and 
 
[..] found Meng Fu, a retired diplomat who, during a post in Chile, had learned 
some basic expressions and was now in the provinces, working with the Agri-
cultural Commission. Meng was appointed dean of Spanish studies and tasked 
with training a dozen students who could help [the delegates] from Latin 
America.22 (See also Fig. 2) 
 
After 1952, some Soviet teachers began to using Soviet textbooks and dictionar-
ies to teach foreign languages to Chinese youth promotions in Beijing, in particular 
Russian but also German, French and Spanish. This initiative laid the foundations for 
a first generation of Chinese and Latin Americans who began working on translation 
and editing of news and texts. Among this first generation were Fausto Cabrera and 
                                                 
20 Hao, Zhang and Arana, David Ignacio Ibarra. “Peace Conference of Asia and the Pacific Region 
(October, 1952): An Approach between China and Central America.” Revista Estudios, 33, 2016, 
dossier Estudios sobre China desde (Latino) América en conmemoración de los 160 años de la 
llegada de los chinos a Costa Rica.  
21 Bermudez, Andrés Lopez. Jorge Zalamea: enlace de dos mundos. Quehacer literario y cosmop-
olitismo (1905-1969). Bogotá: Editorial Universidad del Rosario, 2014. 
22 Macarena, Vidal Lit. “Los duros comienzos del español: ‘un francés mal hablado’ en China.” 





Ricardo Samper Carrizosa, who in 1979 would be the first Colombian chargé d’af-
faires ad interim in Beijing.23 This early core of specialists and experts in foreign lan-
guages gathered around the Beijing Foreign Studies University (BFSU), an institution 
of great importance to the PRC government’s domestic and foreign policy. The BFSU 
was affiliated with the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs from its establishment in 
1941. The Chinese system of foreign experts or foreign specialists24 was copied from 
the USSR, which consisted of bringing in or sending out advisors or experts in various 
areas such as health, agriculture, engineering, education and translation. It was a spe-
cial phenomenon in the internal relations of the Communist Bloc and between the 
Communist Bloc and the countries of the Third World throughout the Cold War. 
As tensions between Beijing and Moscow mounted in the early 1960s, the Sovi-
ets began to leave the PRC and the number of specialists from other nationalities (in-
cluding Latin Americans) increased. Some of them came from communist parties that 
had Maoist groups. Others, who did not necessarily belong to communist parties, 
came to support the construction of socialism in the PRC. Yet regardless of where 
they came from, foreign experts began to play a key role in coordinating the PRC’s 
soft power efforts in the Latin American countries of the Pacific Rim. The case of 
Francisco Posada Cano exemplifies the journey of many Latin Americans who came 
to the PRC in the years prior to the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). Contacted at the 
PRC embassy in Havana, Posada Cano arrived with his family in Beijing to work at 
XNCR. The authorities of the CCP gave him accommodation at the mythical Beijing 
Friendship Hotel, on South Zhongguancun Street, where he met other Latin Ameri-
cans who were staying there and who also worked at the BFSU or at the Editorial of 
Foreign Languages.25 Some first-hand accounts coincide in pointing out that the Bei-
jing Friendship Hotel had enough free rooms due to  the mass departure of the Soviets 
in 1962.26 
Political violence was another factor that prompted several Latin Americans to 
travel to the PRC. In the case of Colombia, the development of the guerrilla move-
ments in the late 1960s increased the pressure of the state security organizations on 
movements of students, peasants and trade unionists. Faced with state persecution and 
to guarantee their own personal safety, some young students chose to travel to the 
                                                 
23 In this first group were Afonso Graíño, Gustavo Vargas and their wives. See Posada Cano, 
Enrique. “Mi larga travesía con los Chinos.” China y Colombia, op. cit.; Posada Cano, Enrique. 
Historias del Hotel de la Amistad. Beijing: New World Press, 2010, p. 158.   
24 Foreign specialists or foreign experts, both terms appear in the sources I have consulted. See 
Bernstein, Thomas and Yu-Li, Hua (eds.). China Learns from the Soviet Union, 1949—Present. 
Lanham, MD: Lexington Books,  Harvard Cold War studies book series, 2010. 
25 “Fútbol, periodismo y acupuntura: coctel en las relaciones colombo-chinas”, Revista Amigos de 
China, Separata Especial de febrero de 2005. 





PRC.27 Lilia Rodriguez, a young Colombian with Maoist sympathis, had to travel to 
Beijing in the early 1970s upon learning of the murder of a union leader with whom 
her husband had close contact. Upon arriving in Beijing, Lilia was given accommo-
dation at the Friendship Hotel and entered the BFSU to study Chinese and translation. 
Her husband went directly to work at XNRC as an announcer on the Spanish-language 
broadcasts of Radio Peking to which I will refer to later on.28 
At the BFSU, Lilia also met several young Chileans who came to Beijing after 
General Augusto Pinochet’s coup d'état that overthrew the socialist government of 
Salvador Allende in 1973.29 The PRC did not break off diplomatic relations with Pi-
nochet’s government, since he recognized Mainland China as the only legitimate gov-
ernment of China (the One China Doctrine). Pinochet’s decision not to recognize the 
government of Chang Kai-shek in Taipei, paradoxically, made the Chilean post-coup 
military government one of the friendliest toward the PRC.30 It is not clear whether 
there was an agreement between the Pinochet government and the PRC so that the 
exiles could leave South America and travel across the Pacific, but many young Chil-
ean students arrived in Beijing after 1973. 
The relationship between migration, foreign experts and the spread of Maoism 
in Colombia or other Latin American countries on the Pacific basin is not yet clear, 
but the development of the Maoist guerrillas from the 1960s provides sufficient reason 
to question it. Between 1949 and 1976, nearly a thousand Latin Americans visited the 
PRC.31 It is plausible that some young Latin Americans who visited the PRC as ex-
perts became ideologues and active militants of the guerrilla groups.32  The example 
of the Peruvian guerrilla leader Abimael Guzmán, founder and maximum leader of 
Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path), who visited the PRC on at least two occasions be-




                                                 
27 To this we must add that the Maoists who maintained contacts with clandestine guerrilla organ-
izations were not only persecuted by the state security organizations, but also did not have the 
support of the networks of the Colombian Communist Party because they had been expelled from 
it since 1964. 
28 Interview with Lilia Rodriguez*, op. cit. 
29 Interview with Lilia Rodriguez*, op. cit. 
30  Montalva, Juan Diego and Navia, Patricio. “Chile and China: Building Relations Beyond 
Trade?” Center for Hemispheric Policy, University of Miami, March 6, 2007, On line, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20151229101131/https://umshare.miami.edu/web/wda/hemi-
sphericpolicy/Final_Draft_Formatted-Navia.pdf, consulted on May 14, 2020.   
31 Rothwell, Matthew Daniel. “Influencia de la revolución china en América Latina: México, Perú 
y Bolivia.” Fuentes. Revista de la Biblioteca y Archivo Histórico de la Asamblea Legislativa 
Plurinacional, vol. 4, n. 9, 2010, pp. 5-11. 




Radio: Pekin Informa and Xinhua Chinese Radio 
 
During the Cold War, radio was one of the most powerful instruments of cultural 
diplomacy. Between the 1950’s and the 70’s, radio programs were an effective way 
to disseminate political messages and notions of official culture in real time. In addi-
tion, as had occurred during WWII, radio made it possible to mobilize the population 
around the world. As with other nations’ external broadcasters such as The Voice of 
America from the US, BBC World Service and Radio Australia, Chinese radio played 
a significant role in the Chinese’s soft power strategy to expand the influence of the 
PRC in the world.33Radio was introduced in China in the 1920’s and 30’s. The CCP 
used radio for the first time in March 1940, with a transmitter imported from Moscow. 
The radio station of the Communist Party (XNCR) went on the air from Yan’an in 
December 1940. After 1945, it transmitted to a larger geographical area, with its pro-
grams becoming more regular and formalized with broadcasts of news, official an-
nouncements, war bulletins, art and literary programs. The English service started in 
September of 1947, broadcasting from a cave in the Taihang Mountains (when China 
was in the midst of civil war) to announce newly-conquered areas and broadcast the 
communist political and cultural perspective of China to the world at large. The station 
moved from the Taihang Mountains to Beijing during the Red Liberation Army’s 
Pingjin campaign and announced the creation of the PRC in 1949. Its name was 
changed to Radio Beijing in April 1950. In September 1956, broadcasts began for-
mally for Spain and, a year later, on December 17, 1957, broadcasts for Latin America 
started.34 
By 1963, the new program entitled Pekin Informa broadcast four daily programs 
for eleven Latin American countries. Broadcasts were made from Beijing, by 
longwave and were heard between six in the afternoon and eleven at night.35 The pre-
cise content of these programs remains unclear today, but some interviews allow me 
to argue that the transmissions of the era had three different kinds of content: news 
about China, news about the world, and short reports about aspects of cultural, politi-
cal and industrial life in China. However, as the PRC’s archives are closed, it is im-
possible to conduct a thorough analysis of the Pekin Informa broadcast in Colombia 
or throughout Latin America during the Cold War.  
It is important to highlight that the XNCR, the producer of Pekin Informa in 
Spanish, was the platform that permitted the first official contacts between the PRC 
                                                 
33 Ding, Sheng. The Dragon’s Hidden Wings: How China Rises with its Soft Power. Lanham, MD: 
Lexington Books, 2008. 
34 “Breve historia del Departamento de Español.” China Radio International (CRI), http://es-
panol.cri.cn/1/2005/01/27/1@52094.htm; Chang, Won Ho. Mass Media in China: The History 
and the Future. Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1989; Howkins, John. Mass Communication 
in China. New York: Longman Communication Books, 1982. 




and the Colombian administration of President Julio Cesar Turbay Ayala. The ac-
counts of past and current members of the CCFA make it possible to reconstruct the 
phase prior to the establishment of the first diplomatic legation of the PRC in Colom-
bia and to understand the importance of cultural exchanges as a foundation for build-
ing formal diplomatic relations. Thanks to the efforts of CCFA members to convince 
various high-ranking officials of the Colombian government of the relevance of es-
tablishing informal channels of communication with the PRC, the first headquarters 
of XNCR was installed in Bogotá in 1979, in a building located at Calle 53 and Car-
rera 7, between Galerías and Teusaquillo. After his creation, XNCR-Bogotá was in 
charge of consular services. Some CCFA members, such as Francisco Posada Cano, 
to whom I referred to previously, recall that visas to travel to the PRC were issued by 
XNCR-Bogotá “on separate pieces of paper, so as not to qualify [the travelers] as 
‘subversive’ allies of ‘red China’, the name with which the spokesmen of the Cold 
War stigmatized [the PRC]”.36 
Because the PRC had no direct official ties with Colombia, it was difficult to 
obtain work visas for members of XNCR-Bogotá. However, once again, the CCFA’s 
lobbying of President Turbay Ayala and the Colombian Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Diego Uribe allowed visas for Qiu Ling and Wu Huizhong to be processed.37 Qiu Lin, 
a main correspondent of the XNRC, was a Cantonese journalist described as a very 
talented negotiator, fine connoisseur of Cantonese food and a good acupuncturist. This 
last quality cannot be ignored because Qiu Lin quickly gained a reputation as a good 
acupuncturist in Bogotá, and a few months after his arrival, he began treating a lum-
bago that afflicted the President of the Republic, Turbay Ayala. In circumstances that 
are unclear, when the ROC legation decided to leave Colombia, Qiu Ling, through the 
good offices of the Cambodian Embassy in Bogotá, received the former home of the 
ROC legation and a diplomatic car.38 A year later, in 1980, Ricardo Samper Carrizosa 
was appointed as Colombian chargé d’affaires ad interim in Beijing. Some months 








                                                 
36 Posada Cano, Enrique. “Mi larga travesía con los Chinos.” China y Colombia, op. cit., p. 158. 
37 Antecedentes de las relaciones Colombo-chinas. See Amigos de China, Separata Especial de 
febrero de 2005, China y Colombia, op. cit. 
38 Idem, p. 77. 
39 Medina, María Angélica. “Julio Mario Santo Domingo, Primer Embajador Colombiano en 




“The Beijing Review” 
 
Those who walked the streets of downtown Bogotá in the first half of the 1970s 
saw magazines such as Pekin Informa, China reconstruye, China ilustrada, or Vi-
etnam Hoy.40 On Calle 19, between Carreras 7 and 9, there were different stands of 
national and international newspapers, magazines and books, whose vendors wel-
comed a wide readership of students, university professors, people who worked in the 
services sector, and in general, all those interested in acquiring international publica-
tions at good prices.41 
Some of the magazines sold on Calle 19 came from the Cinco Continentes 
bookstore, located a few streets south of Calle 19. Founded between 1972 and 1973, 
the Cinco Continentes bookstore was one of the nodal points of a vast network that 
included Communists, Maoists, Trotskyists and a whole plurality of people mobilized 
in Colombia’s student, peasant and unionist movements.42 Owned by Francisco Po-
sada Cano, who was living in Beijing at the time and ensured shipments of books, 
Cinco Continentes sold and distributed publications from the Beijing Foreign Lan-
guage Publishing House, such as the Selected Works of Mao Zedong, or books on 
traditional Chinese medicine (with acupuncture needles included) that were purchased 
by medicine students. Additionally, the bookstore could handle special requests for 
magazines and books distributed by Guoji Shudian, in charge of distributing the 
PRC’s publications to the rest of the world.43 
One of the most popular magazines sold and distributed by Cinco Continentes 
was Pekin Informa, a magazine in Spanish of PRC news and views published and 
printed in Beijing. It provided economic, political and cultural information concerning 
the PRC and its relations with the rest of the world. Each issue of the magazine had 
analytical and informative articles, giving facts and background on domestic events 
in the PRC and a special section that reported on all the social, cultural and political 
events that took place every week in Beijing. Full texts of important statements of the 
PRC’s domestic and foreign policy were printed in a documentary section, as were 
essential statistics, graphs and charts, cartoons and some pictures. In addition to this, 
the magazine translated and published official documents from the highest levels of 
the Chinese government and of the CCP. 
The history of Pekin Informa, as well as the PRC’s other magazines and publi-
cations distributed by Guoji Shudian, were linked to the PRC’s cultural diplomacy. 
The Spanish, French and Japanese editions of the magazine appeared one year after 
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the Sino-Soviet Split, a fact that without a doubt proves the PRC’s need to create new 
communication channels with Asia, Europe and Latin America after the traumatic loss 
of its most important ally. Issues in English were published every week, while issues 
in Spanish and French were published every two weeks.44 
The Spanish edition had news, reports and reprints of other publications such as 
the People’s Daily, the most popular newspaper in the PRC, and Red Flag, a theoret-
ical magazine created in the late 1950s that expressed the points of view of the CCP. 
In the 1960s and ’70s, these two publications were quite important because they al-
lowed readers to stay informed of what was happening in Mainland China and because 
the information they distributed was considered to be the official view of the CCP 
leadership. To that extent, Pekin Informa was a means of transmitting the main direc-
tives of the pro-Chinese international communist movement to the entire audience of 
Spanish-speaking readers. 
What kind of content could a Spanish reader expect? As an example, in the first 
issue of 1963, there was a wide range of topics that give an account of the prevailing 
agreements and divergences in international communism. There was also a complete 
reprint of the CCP’s position presented to the different world congresses that had been 
held in the Communist Bloc and in some international left-wing organizations be-
tween 1961 and 1963. The content of the articles or of the informative reprints shows 
that the magazine served as a means to align political groups around the world with 
the PRC’s form of communism. 
Sometimes subtly, but most often quite openly, the contents of Pekin Informa 
reproduced the PRC’s foreign policy guidelines adapted to specific audiences, such 
as Latin Americans. One specific example is the way in which the CCP instrumental-
ized the 1963 visit of the Prince of Cambodia to Beijing, which served to demonstrate 
that the PRC showed respect to any country, regardless of its political regime, its in-
ternational importance or the size of its population. What is interesting is the effort to 
demonstrate that the PRC respected smaller nations fit with the editorial line of several 
of the articles in the magazine with a twofold objective: on the one hand, to demon-
strate that the PRC, contrary to the US or the USSR, respected the principle of sover-
eign equality between states (which of course meant that the PRC should be able to 
take China’s seat at the UN), and on the other hand, and even more importantly, by 
speaking of small countries, the CCP sought to support Cuba, which after the Cuban 
Missile Crisis of 1962, came to occupy a major place in the confrontation between the 
two superpowers.45 The magazine’s interpretative canon was notorious in stressing 
the importance of the peasant uprisings as promoters of the Cuban revolutionary trans-
formation, but without referring to the guerrilla outbreaks (foquismo) theorized by 
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Ernesto Che Guevara or Régis Debray. The sublimation of the figure of the peasant 
in the PRC’s assessment of the Cuban Revolution was a way of establishing a bridge 
with the Latin American (and probably African) agrarian countries. 
The end of the Cultural Revolution, the failure of the “Gang of Four” and Deng 
Xiaoping’s swift ascension as the new strongman of the CCP brought drastic changes 
in the PRC’s cultural diplomacy to the other side of the Pacific. Pekin Informa con-
tinued to be printed and distributed to the entire world, but the change that it under-
went can be easily seen when comparing the issues from 1976 and 1977: first, a 
change in the contents, to the extent that the official propaganda initiated the condem-
nation of the “Gang of Four” and, secondly, a change in the layout of the magazine 
itself. Although Pekin Informa continued to sell and circulate in Colombia, Cinco 
Continentes stopped receiving the weekly air shipments from the PRC. The bookstore 
closed its doors at some point between 1977 and 1978.46 Regarding the network of 
foreign experts, it is important to mention that from 1976 many of them left the PRC 
because they either believed that the Maoist dream was being abandoned or simply 
changed professions.47 
A new phase in the international communist movement, and in particular in Mao-
ism, took place with the start of Deng Xiaoping’s economic opening-up reforms. The 
accusations of revisionism that had previously been launched by Mao Zedong against 
Khrushchev and the Soviet Communist Party were thereafter leveled by Colombians 
against Hua Guofeng and Deng Xiaoping. Many of the Colombian Maoists turned to 
the Leninist-Marxist international movement that Albanian Prime Minister Enver 
Hoxha tried to build. In 1978, the VII Congress of the Albanian Labor Party, held in 
Tirana, was attended by delegations from the Marxist-Leninist Communist Parties 
from Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador and Uruguay. During the 
sessions, the Albanians confirmed that in Latin America, and particularly in Colom-
bia, there was deep dissatisfaction with the CCP’s orientation.48 In the case of certain 
Colombian Maoist groups, the fact that the PRC ceased to be the benchmark for the 
global Marxist-Leninist revolution caused a new phenomenon of political radicaliza-
tion: between 1977 and 1978, in circumstances that remain ambiguous, the first Mao-
ist-oriented urban clandestine armed cells emerged in Bogotá and Medellín.  
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The end of the Cultural Revolution marked a drastic change in the PRC’s domes-
tic and foreign policy. While Radio Pekin and Pekin Informa continued to be broad-
casted and published after 1976, the contents of the broadcasts and the publications 
began a gradual but unrelenting transformation: they ceased to be organs for the dis-
semination of PRC politics and began to limit themselves to spreading an image of 
the PRC’s greatness and prosperity, without emphasizing the export of Maoism or the 
need to create the conditions for new communist revolutions around the world. De-
spite the political changes operated in the PRC during the Boluan Fanzheng and the 
Reforms and Opening Up programs led by Deng Xiaoping, broadcasts for Colombia 
and other Latin American countries such as Peru and Bolivia never stopped. Radio 
internet transmissions from the PRC to Latin America continue to the present day. 
This aspect must be taken into account to judge the continuities in the PRC’s foreign 
policy in the Pacific Rim.  
The PRC’s cultural diplomacy toward Colombia was effective. In the context of 
an intense diplomatic blockade that lasted at least until the end of the Vietnam War, 
cultural diplomacy allowed the PRC to stop being seen as a factor of destabilization 
of the international system. Cultural diplomacy led the new communist authorities to: 
(a) export Maoism as the new ideology of the world communist revolution; (b) build 
unofficial channels of communication with governments that had not recognized the 
PRC;  and (c) build and strengthen a global propaganda device made up of radio 
broadcasts, magazines and expert networks that acted to support communism in Main-
land China. 
In addition to allowing a change of perception, cultural diplomacy also initiated 
a policy of influence of the PRC in the Pacific Ocean. The Chinese Communist Rev-
olution not only transformed the balance of powers within Asia, but also caused 
changes on a transpacific scale. The Korean War, the export of Maoism as an alterna-
tive to Soviet Communism, the beginning of the slow but inexorable commercial com-
petition with the US after the economic opening of the mid-1970s and the Vietnam 
War, which set a definitive historical limit to the ambitions of western countries in 
Asia, were signs of a major transformation in the mental geography of new genera-
tions across the Pacific. In particular, the export of Maoism was a phenomenon that 
shaped the domestic situation of Latin American countries with a rural background 
such as Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia for several decades. As I have illustrated 
in the previous pages, in these countries, Maoism appeared as a real revolutionary 
alternative promoted by influential members of the intellectual elites, as well as by 
student and peasant movements. 
In a scenario traditionally dominated by the US and the USSR, the PRC managed 
to establish links both with the governments of the South American Pacific and with 
social groups of students and intellectuals that later enabled greater rapprochement 




that had been created with Japan, South Korea or Hong Kong had followed the routes 
drawn, and largely controlled, by the US and the UK. However, the PRC built direct 
links without mediation. This represented a new path in transpacific history. 
To finish this article, I would like to say that the history of Latin Americans re-
mains inextricably tied to a transatlantic point of view. Their Iberian past or historical 
interpretations based on the sharing of structural factors such as Catholicism, demo-
cratic models and the market economy would make Latin America a kind of extreme 
West. However, when studying the exchanges between the Far East and the Pacific 
countries of Latin America at the beginning of the Cold War, another geography of 
transpacific networks and connections appears, a geography that still needs to be built 
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Figure 1. Letter from Chu Po-Shen to Alfonso Romero Buj. Archivo General de la 









Figure 2. Book cover of Reunión en Pekín, by Jorge Zalamea, 1952. Mareas del 







Figure 3.  Manuel Zapata Olivella and Jorge Zalamea during the Feast of Pigeons, 









Figure 4.  Daily radio broadcasts to Latin America and Spain, Pekin Informa, No. 1  













Figure 6.  Magazine cover of Pekin Informa, No. 1 (special opening number), 1963. 
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